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POSTSCRIPTS

A Child's Right to Choose
His Own Religion
THE CATHOLIC

LAWYER

has frequently

discussed the legal aspect of the religious
upbringing of children.' A recent case,
Hehman v. Hehman,2 allowed the thirteenyear-old child of legally separated parents
to choose his own religion. The husband
was Lutheran, the wife Catholic. Their prenuptial agreement had provided that the first
child be reared a Catholic and the second
a Lutheran. Their separation decree had
awarded custody of their three children to
the mother, but gave the father the right to
visit the second child, John, on Sundays for
the purpose of attending to John's religious
education. The husband now moved to punish his wife for her failure to observe his
right to educate John in the Lutheran religion, averring that she had surreptitiously
influenced the child to embrace Catholicism.
After pointing out, in an extended dictum, 3 the dangers inherent in mixed marriages, the court stated that John was a
ward of the court. It continued that a prenuptial agreement concerning the child's
welfare must be disregarded if the court

1 See generally Leen, Justice Denied- The Ellis
Case, 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 83 (Winter 1958);
Recent Developments, 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 361
(Autumn 1958), 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 158 (April
1955), 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 66 (January 1955).
2Hehman v. Hehman, 178 N.Y.S. 2d 328 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
s Id. at 329-30.

sees that the child's best interests would not
be protected by observing the agreement.
To force John to be a Lutheran, thereby
observing the agreement, is to disrupt an
all-Catholic household; to force John to be
a Catholic, although furthering domestic
harmony, is to deprive him of his right to
espouse freely a particular religion. The
court resolved the dilemma of choosing
John's religion by allowing him to choose
his own, citing as controlling law Martin v.
Martin,4 where the Court of Appeals
allowed the same choice to a twelve-yearold. The court felt that John "has been
made acquainted with both credal points
of view and forms of worship, and with the
heart of a child he may speed directly to
what is truth for him more quickly and
accurately than we adults. .. "5
In decreeing that the child choose his
own religion, the court is in harmony with
the natural law principle which prohibits
direct interference with the dictates of the
conscience of one who has attained the age
of reason. 6 Thus, even if a court saw, as the
Hehman court did, that the paramount
temporal welfare of the child lay in embracing Catholicism, the court could not
force him to choose a religion which his
conscience could not accept.
4 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E. 2d 812 (1954)

(per

curiam). See discussion of the Martin case in
1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 66-67 (January 1955).
5 Hehman v. Hehman, supra note 2, at 331.
6 See generally HIGGINS, MAN AS MAN 125-38
(1949).
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Durham Rule Rejected by
Massachusetts and Eighth Circuit
Two more jurisdictions - one state and
one federal - have expressly rejected the
Durham rule of insarnity in favor of the
traditional M'Naghten test of mental disease and criminal responsibility as supplemented by the "irresistible impulse" rule.
The M'Naghten-Durham controversy was
explored in a symposium discussion in the
last two issues of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER.'
Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v.
Chester,2 condemned the Durham or "product" test that controls in the District of
Columbia 3 for its "broad language and ambiguities," 4 noting that such key terms as
"disease," "defect," and "product," are left
undefined under the Durham rationale. The
court instead applied the existing Massachusetts standard of legal insanity, basically a broadened application of the
M'Naghten rule, that exculpates the accused from criminal responsibility for his
conduct if at the time of the criminal act
he was suffering from such a mental condition as to render him incapable of resisting
the impulse to do the act.
In the federal jurisdiction the Eighth
Circuit declined to adopt the Durham rule
in Voss v. United States.5 Said the court:
We think it can be no concern of this
Court whether the M'Naughten Rule is,
from a psychological, medical, or scientific
standpoint, accurate or not. The Rule has
thus far, with few exceptions, constituted
the test for determining legal responsibility

of those accused of crime. Certainly, a federal trial judge who follows the teachings of
the United States Supreme Court in this regard cannot justifiably be held to have committed an error of law. 6
In the course of their opinions, both
courts indicated some dissatisfaction with
the traditional tests of legal insanity as
viewed against the growing fund of scientific
knowledge on the workings of the human
mind. However, both also reached the conclusion that the Durham rule was not the
solution to the problem of the mentally
deranged defendant before the bar of
justice.

1 Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility A Symposium, 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 294 (Autumn

6 Voss v. United States, supra note 5, at 703.
1 Baer v. Kolmorgen, 170 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct.

1958), 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER 3 (Winter 1959).
2
-Mass. -, 150 N.E.2d 914 (1958).
3 See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
4 Commonwealth v. Chester, - Mass. -, 150 N.E.
2d 914, 920 (1958).
5 259 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1958).

Church and State
The New York Supreme Court has again
refused to enjoin the erection of a Nativity
Scene on public school property. A petition
to enjoin, pendente lite, the school board
of Ossining, New York from authorizing
the Creche was denied in 19571 on the
ground that the alleged damages were too
vague and speculative. 2 Denying permanent
injunctive relief in December of 1958, the
Court held that the only taxpayer who had
standing to sue had not shown danger of
irreparable injury; nor was it shown that
there was, at this time, an application for
approval pending - hence there was nothing to enjoin. 3 In addition to the injunction,
plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgment.
Dicta in last year's suit indicated that the

1957). This case was treated in 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 281 (Summer 1958).
2 Plaintiffs alleged deleterious psychological ef-

fects on the minds of school children from this
"preferential" act. 170 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
3 Baer v. Kolmorgen, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct.
1958).

5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING

court felt that there had been no violation
of the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of religion. The nature of the controversy
prompted the present Court to examine the
plaintiff's right to the declaratory relief
sought, but the constitutionality of such an
action by the school board was upheld.
Mr. Justice Gallagher's opinion is noteworthy for its clear statement and careful
application of the First Amendment. The
Court insisted on construing the Constitution, rather than its commentators, and
stated two general bases for attacking a
statute or resolution on constitutional
grounds:
First: Where a person is required to submit
to some religious rite or instruction or is deprived or threatened with deprivation of his
freedom for resisting that unconstitutional
requirement; second: Where a person is deprived of property for unconstitutional purposes (such as a direct or indirect tax to
support a religious establishment) .... 4
Since neither public funds nor the time of
any school personnel were involved, the
second basis failed. Against plaintiff's contention that pupils were subjected to religious influences and ". . . obliged to attend
and participate in the veneration of sectarian
religious symbols . . . ,"I the Court observed that since school was not in session
during the period of the display, the allegation of "teaching" and obligatory attendance
were patently fallacious, and felt, moreover,
that religious symbolism, inescapable during
this season, could not be said to have any
greater influence when displayed on public
rather than private property. McCollum v.
Board of Educ.6 was distinguished on its
4 Id. at

237.

5 Ibid.

6 333 U.S. 203 (1948)

(religious instruction by

clergymen in public schools held unconstitutional).
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facts. There public property was used for
actual religious instruction. Here, not only
were there no classes in session but there
was an absence of proof ". . . that instruction was given as to the meaning of the
Creche or that it was in fact employed as
7
a means of teaching."
The Court not only upheld the constitutionality of this "accommodation of religious groups" but approved the ". . . spirit
of cooperation which prompted it.... ." On
the authority of Zorach v. Clauson,9 the
doctrine of absolute separation of church
and state was rejected:
If such accommodation violates the doctrine
of absolute separation between church and
state, then it is time that that doctrine be discarded once and for all. Absolute separation
is not and never has been required by the
Constitution.' 0
Kerala Communist
Education Bill Signed
The President of the Republic of India
has signed into law a communist-sponsored
bill designed to subject Catholic schools to
state control in the Red-dominated province
of Kerala.'
The Kerala Education Bill, first passed
by the legislature of Kerala in September,
1957, and discussed in previous issues of
THE CATHOLiC LAWYER, 2 confers power
on the state government to assume the management of state-aided private schools
throughout Kerala. Communist Party candidates have a majority in the Kerala Legis7 Baer v. Kolmorgen, supra note 3, at 238.
8 ld. at 239.

9 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released time for students
attending religious instruction held constitutional).
10 Baer v. Kolmorgen, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230, 238-39
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
'N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1959, p. 4, col. 7.
2 Minattur, The Kerala Education Bill, 4 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 233 (Summer 1958); 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 366 (Autumn 1958).
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lature and most of the state-aided private
schools in the province are operated by the
Catholic Church.
The Education Law took effect in late
February after the President approved a revised version of the 1957 bill. The bill as
first passed by the Kerala Legislature had
been termed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India on May 22, 1958, in
an unprecedented advisory opinion requested by the President.
The court said that provisions of the bill
authorizing the state legislature to either
acquire the private schools outright, or to
take over management of the private school
system and to set fee systems, violated the
constitutional right of religious or linguistic
minorities - "to establish and administer
'3
educational institutions of their choice."
3 INDIA CONST. art.

30(1) (1950).

Acting on the basis of the court's opinion, the President refused to sign the first
bill. The Kerala Legislature passed a revised version of the act in November, 1958,
and it is this version that the President
has signed. The law as adopted does not
contain the clauses found objectionable by
the Supreme Court but still provides that
the schools must appoint teachers from a
list supplied by the state's Public Service
Commission.
Archbishop Mather Kavukattu of Changanacheri recently presided at a meeting at
which it was decided that, rather than submit to communist-appointed teachers, the
Catholic schools will not reopen after the
4
summer vacation.
4 N.Y. Times, April 30, 1959, p. 16, col. 6.

